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CoNTRACTs-DAMAGES-PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDED FOR BREACH AccoM-
PANIED BY FRAUDULENT ACT-Defendants contracted to purchase a crop 
of alfalfa from plaintiff, harvesting and processing to be done by de-
fendants and payment to be ascertained according to the processed weight 
of the alfalfa. When defendants harvested the entire crop but failed to 
pay for the major part of it, plaintiff brought action for breach of con-
tract. In addition to the non-payment, plaintiff alleged fraud on defendants' 
part in falsifying weight records and in otherwise scheming to cheat and de-
fraud him. On defendants' appeal from a judgment including both com-
pensatory and punitive damages, held, affirmed. Although punitive damages 
are not ordinarily recoverable in an action for breach of contract, they may 
be awarded if the breach is accompanied by a fraudulent act, wanton in 
character and maliciously intentional. Whitehead v. Allen, (N.M. 1957) 
313 P. (2d) 335. 
The traditional rule that punitive damages are not recoverable in an 
action for breach of contract has been justified on various grounds,1 and 
1 These have included a desire to restrict the entire field of punitive damages, a 
feeling that the most the law attempts to do in actions for breach of contract is to put 
the injured party in the financial condition 'he would ,have been in had the breach not 
occurred, and an unwillingness to apply principles of damages which might lead to un-
certainty and confusion in commercial affairs. Addis v. Gramaphone Co., [1909] A.C. 488. 
See McCORMICK, DAMAGES §81, p. 291 (1935). 
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although a few carefully defined exceptions have been recognized,2 the 
majority of the jurisdictions which have considered the problem still 
adhere to the rule.8 An increasing number of jurisdictions, however, have 
recognized an exception to the rule when defendant's conduct has gone 
beyond mere breach of contract. In the principal case, punitive damages 
were awarded when the breach was "accompanied by a fraudulent act, 
wanton in character and maliciously intentional."4 Several other states have 
allowed such recovery if the breach of contract also was accompanied by 
or contained the elements of an aggravated tort.5 Two states, South 
Carolina and Texas, have long permitted punitive damages for certain 
types of breach of contract. In South Carolina it now seems to be well 
settled that a fraudulent act accompanying the breach will permit the 
2 The most significant exception has ,been the breach of promise to marry. McCormick 
suggests that this stands apart because the marriage relation itself is more than a con-
tract obligation and is given more protection by the law than are ordinary contracts. 
McCORMICK, DAMAGES §81, p. 291 (1935). Another exception is the refusal by a banker 
to honor a depositor's check when there are sufficient funds on deposit to meet it. See 
Addis v. Gramaphone Co., note 1 supra. Numerous cases involving breach of duty by 
common carriers and other public service companies have included awards of punitive 
damages; however, these cases are often treated as tortious breaches of special public 
duties. See McCORMICK, DAMAGES §81, pp. 288-289 (1935). 
3 In ten states this determination has been by judicial decision: Alabama, Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. Benson, 159 Ala. 254, 48 S. 712 (1908); Colorado, Sams v. Curfman, 
Ill Colo. 124, 137 P. (2d) 1017 (1943); Illinois, Hayes v. Moynihan, 52 Ill. 423 (1869); 
Kentucky, Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Sutton, 156 Ky. 191, 160 S.W. 949 
(1913); Missouri, Williams v. Kansas City Public Service Co., (Mo. 1956) 294 S.W. (2d) 
36; New York, Duche v. Wilson, 37 Hun (N.Y.) 519 (1885); Oregon, Weaver v. Austin, 
184 Ore. 586, 200 P. (2d) 593 (1948); Pennsylvania, Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. (IO Casey) 
9 (1859); Tennessee, Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W. (2d) 377 (1955); West Virgin-
ia, Hurxthal v. Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1903). Three states have reached the 
same result by statute: California, Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. (2d) 480, 196 P. (2d) 915 (1948); 
Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. (2d) 398, 303 P. (2d) 1029 (1956), citing Cal. Code (Deering, 
1949) §3294; Georgia, Nichols v. Williams Pontiac, Inc., (Ga. App. 1957) 98 S.E. 
(2d) 659, citing Ga. Code Ann. (1935) §20-1405; Oklahoma, Sinclair Refining Co. v. 
Shaffer, 177 Okla. 610, 61 P. (2d) 571 (1936), citing what is now 23 Okla. Stat. Ann. 
(1955) §§9, 21. Four other states have completely rejected punitive damages in any civil 
action: Louisiana, Janssen Catering Co. v. Abadie, 157 ,La. 357, 102 S. 428 (1924); Massa-
chusetts, Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891); Nebraska, 
Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68 (1878); Washington, Spokane Truck &: Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 
Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891). 
4 Principal case at 336. 
5 The courts have expressed this requirement of independently tortious conduct in 
various ways. In the following cases the tests indicated were announced for the recov-
erability of punitive damages: Chicago, Rock Island &: Pacific Ry. Co. v. Whitten, 90 
Ark. 462, 119 S.W. 835 (1909) (conduct that was willful, wanton, or consciously indifferent 
to consequences from which malice may be inferred); Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 
(Fla. 1957) 94 S. (2d) 854 (breach accompanied by some intentional wrong, abuse, insult, 
or gross negligence amounting to an independent tort); D. L. Fair Lumber Co. T. Weems, 
196 Miss. 201, 16 S. (2d) 770 (1944) (breach attended by such gross ·negligence or willful 
wrong as to amount to a tort); Forrester v. Southern Pacific Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 P. 753 
(1913) (breach independently tortious); Wright v. Everett, 197 Va. 608, 90 S.E. (2d) 855 
(1956) (breach amounts to an independent, willful tort under proper allegations of malice, 
wantonness and oppression) . 
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awarding of punitive damages,6 while in Texas the tests for recoverability 
have included circumstances of contumely,7 ma]icious or oppressive con-
duct,~ and breach occurring in such a manner as to constitute a tort.9 
All states which allow such recovery base it on actions by defendant which 
accompany and aggravate the breach, rather than on the defendant's 
motives in breaching. It should be further noted that the defendants in 
many of these cases are common carriers or public utilities and that 
punitive damages could be justified for violation of their special kind 
of duty owed the public.10 The decisions which have awarded punitive 
damages on the basis of malicious, willful, wanton, or oppressive con-
duct may well be criticized for injecting into the field of contract damages 
a substantial element of uncertainty. These terms are difficult to define 
precisely, and a breaching party would often be unsure as to whether his 
conduct attending the breach might be interpreted to impose a liability 
for punitive damages. If, however, awarding punitive damages is limited 
to those cases where the breach has been accompanied by an intentional 
fraudulent act, there is much in favor of it. Allowing such damages 
in a contract action in cases where they could also have been allowed 
if plaintiff had elected to bring a tort action for deceit11 on the same 
facts will not lead to any great uncertainty or confusion in commercial 
affairs. Since under modem code pleading the plaintiff pleads facts rather 
than a form of action, he should be allowed to recover the type and amount 
of damages that these facts warrant.12 The New Mexico court is to be com-
mended for adopting a liberal, although still a minority, position on the 
recoverability of punitive damages in actions· for breach of contract. 
Theodore G. Koerner 
6 In Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904) the rule was stated that punitive 
damages could be recovered if the breach was accompanied by a fraudulent act. The later 
case of Winthrop v. Allen, 116 S.C. 388, 108 S.E. 153 (1921), seemed to add the possibility 
that such damages might be recovered where defendant's conduct was merely wanton 
or willful, but this possibility was removed by Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal 
Co., 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203 (1932), which distinguished the Winthrop case as being in 
tort rather than contract and reaffirmed the requirement of a fraudulent act accompany-
ing the breach. See annotation to the Holland case, 84 A.L.R. 1345 (1933). For a recent 
decision following this rule see Roberts v. Fore, (S.C. 1957) 98 S.E. (2d) 766. 
7 Ball v. Britton, 58 Tex. 57 (1882). 
s Tignor v. Toney, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 518, 35 S.W. 881 (1896) (action for conversion); 
Scheps v. Giles, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 222 S.W. 348; National Finance Co. v. Abernathy, 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 66 S.W. (2d) 358. 
9 Etter v. Von Sternberg, (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) 244 S.W. (2d) 321. 
10 See Chicago, Rock Island &: Pacific Ry. Co. v. Whitten, and Forrester v. Southern 
Pacific Co., note 5 supra; Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. &: Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 
S.E. 619 (1911). 
11 Fraud is often mentioned in a general way as a possible ground for the award of 
punitive damages in a tort action; in an action for deceit itself, punitive damages are 
properly recoverable if the fraud is gross, or if there are circumstances clearly indicating 
malice and willfulness, such as a deliberate intent to injure plaintiff. See PROSSER, ToRTS, 
2d ed., §90, p. 570 (1955). 
12 Cl.ARK, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., §43, pp. 259-265 (1~7} • 
